2000. This paper describes a system for the microbiological quantitative risk assessment for food products and their production processes. The system applies a stepwise risk assessment, allowing the main problems to be addressed before focusing on less important problems. First, risks are assessed broadly, using order of magnitude estimates. Characteristic numbers are used to quantitatively characterize microbial behaviour during the production process. These numbers help to highlight the major risk-determining phenomena, and to ®nd negligible aspects. Second, the risk-determining phenomena are studied in more detail. Both general and/or speci®c models can be used for this and varying situations can be simulated to quantitatively describe the risk-determining phenomena. Third, even more detailed studies can be performed where necessary, for instance by using stochastic variables. The system for quantitative risk assessment has been implemented as a decision supporting expert system called SIEFE: Stepwise and Interactive Evaluation of Food safety by an Expert System. SIEFE performs bacterial risk assessments in a structured manner, using various information sources. Because all steps are transparent, every step can easily be scrutinized. In the current study the effectiveness of SIEFE is shown for a cheese spread. With this product, quantitative data concerning the major risk-determining factors were not completely available to carry out a full detailed assessment. However, this did not necessarily hamper adequate risk estimation. Using ranges of values instead helped identifying the quantitatively most important parameters and the magnitude of their impact. This example shows that SIEFE provides quantitative insights into production processes and their risk-determining factors to both risk assessors and decision makers, and highlights critical gaps in knowledge.
INTRODUCTION
Food safety is important for consumers, food producers and inspection authorities for numerous reasons, including consumer protection, producers' risk and international trade. Food safety management systems, such as HACCP, are often designed on the basis of qualitative data. More quantitative insight into food safety issues can be obtained by using quantitative risk assessment. Quantitative risk assessment provides improved understanding of factors involved in food safety. It consists of four steps: (i) hazard identi®cation, (ii) exposure assessment, (iii) hazard characterization, and (iv) risk characterization (CODEX 1997) .
Several quantitative risk assessments for speci®c microbiological hazards in products have been described in the literature. For example, Listeria monocytogenes in soft cheese (Bemrah et al. 1998) , Salmonella enteritidis in pasteurized liquid eggs , Salmonella in chicken products (Brown et al. 1998; Oscar 1998) and Escherichia coli O157:H7 in hamburgers Marks et al. 1998) .
In contrast to these examples for speci®c food products, McNab (1998) presented an approach for quantitative risk assessment for microbial food safety in general. The pre-sent study also describes a general method for systematic quantitative risk assessment for microbial safety of food products. The ®rst part of this paper introduces the stepwise and interactive method that has been developed for bacteria. The second part describes the application of the method for a cheese spread.
SIEFE AS A STRUCTURED METHOD FOR QUAN TITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT
The stepwise method has been implemented as a decision supporting expert system called SIEFE: Stepwise and Interactive Evaluation of Food safety by an Expert system. SIEFE has been developed for quantitative risk assessment associated with microbial hazards for food products and production processes. It uses three levels of detail, ranging from semiquantitative, rough risk assessments to detailed quantitative risk assessments. The stepwise approach focuses on the aspects that quantitatively determine the risk to a signi®cant extent and thus prevents important aspects from being overlooked.
SIEFE starts with hazard identi®cation. Hazards can be identi®ed at three levels of detail according to the hazard identi®cation procedure proposed by Van Gerwen et al. (1997) . The level of detail in the hazard identi®cation procedure does not have to be the same as the level of detail in the subsequent steps of SIEFE. Actually, the hazard identi®cation procedure can be seen as a stand alone part of SIEFE. The ®rst and second level of detail of the other parts of SIEFE are described in the next sections.
Level 1 risk assessment
The ®rst level of detail is a rough, semiquantitative level. This level provides rough estimates of risks related to the consumption of a food product and identi®es risk-determining phenomena.
Level 1: Exposure assessment Ð process identification.
At the ®rst level of detail, process steps and related data for time, temperature (T), pH and water activity (a w ) are gathered, and entered in a table. Temperature, pH and a w are assumed to remain constant during a process step. The estimated orders of magnitude in the ®rst level of detail are generally conservative enough to be able to omit quantitatively negligible aspects without missing any potential relevant ones. For certain process steps the estimates might be too cautious. This will then be detected in level 2.
Level 1: Exposure assessment Ð contamination. In the ®rst level of detail it is assumed that all products are contaminated. The initial contamination level is assumed to be one per serving, so N 0 1 cfu serving À1 . A serving is assumed to generally contain 100 g of the product. As a consequence, exposure is actually based on the change of the concentration of organisms in a serving, instead of being estimated as a concentration of organisms present. The knowledge rules presented in Table 3 highlight the necessity of changing this assumption in cases where the contamination level may greatly in¯uence risk.
Level 1: Exposure assessment ± growth & inactivation. At level 1, orders of magnitude for inactivation and growth are estimated by ®rst order kinetics. The logarithm of the increase or decrease of micro-organisms can then be estimated by the equation:
where N is the concentration of organisms (cfu serving À1 ), and N 0 is the initial concentration of organisms per serving.
For growth, v m, where m is the maximum speci®c growth rate of the organism (s À1 ). The value for m is estimated by means of the gamma model (Zwietering et al. 1996) . The growth characteristics of the various pathogens included in SIEFE were derived from the literature, and placed into the so-called pathogen database (Van Gerwen et al. 1997) . Lag time is neglected in level 1 resulting in fail safe predictions.
For inactivation, v ±k. SIEFE estimates the value for the inactivation rate k (s À1 ) from D-values (D), with equation 1:
D-values were reported for many pathogens under various conditions in the literature and these data were also included in the pathogen database. For the selected hazard, the expert system takes data from the pathogen database and describes log(D) as a response variable of temperature by linear regression. Then the 95% con®dence interval of the estimated log(D temp ) is calculated, and the 95% upper limit is used as a worst-case estimate for D at the temperature of heat treatment.
Inactivation processes may theoretically result in less than 1 cfu serving
À1
. For example if N 10 4 , a reduction of 10 6 results in 10 À2 cfu serving À1 . Since this is not a realistic ®gure, 10 À2 cfu serving À1 is considered as 1 cfu per 100 servings, and SIEFE continues calculations with 1 cfu serving À1 after inactivation. The probability of presence of organisms after inactivation is described by the hazard characteristic OC (`occurrence characterization'). OC is de®ned as the logarithm of the theoretical amount of organisms after inactivation (N ai ,`ai' indicating`after inactivation'), as shown in equation 2.
OC logN ai 2
In the above example, OC À 2. If N ai is larger or equal to one, OC is equal to zero. Reductions of 10 20 or more are considered as complete inactivation; it is assumed that no organisms survive the inactivation treatment. N ai then is zero, and OC ± I.
Level 1: Hazard characterization. Dose±response data estimate the probability of infection and illness after exposure to a certain number of pathogens. Level 1 uses ®rst impressions of pathogen infectivity, provided by attention values for infection and intoxication (AV). Attention values can be derived from, for instance, data on reported outbreaks, expert knowledge, microbiological norms and MID-values (minimal infectious dose). Attention values derived from the literature have been incorporated in the pathogen database. In case exposure to a pathogen is close to, equal to or greater than AV (cfu serving À1 ), the probability that problems will occur is realistic. Examples of AV values for a variety of pathogens are shown in Table 1 .
The probability of foodborne illness as a result of consuming a certain concentration of a hazard can be estimated using the AV. This probability is described by the HC value (`health problem characterization'). HC is de®ned as Table 1 Attention values (AV), dose±response parameters for infection (r; the probability of an organism surviving and causing infection after ingestion, for the Exponential model, and a, b; the parameters of the Beta-distribution, for the Beta-Poisson model) and mortality ratios for various bacteria. These dose±response data result in an estimate of the probability of a certain health effect occurring, given consumption of a contaminated product et al. (1996) , 4 ± Shapton and Shapton (1991), 5 ± Rose et al. (1995 ), 6 ± Bean and Grif®n (1990 ), 7 ± Todd (1989 ), 8 ± ICMSF (1994 ), 9 ± Buchanan et al. (1997 ), 10 ± Teunis et al. (1996 ), 11 ± Hauschild (1993 ), 12 ± Jay (1992 ), 13 ± Ter Steeg and Cuppers (1995 . {(Fatal cases)/(total cases of illness or intoxication for the organism) Â 100.
{If several values were given in literature, the worst case value was taken. xThe average of deaths/cases for the organism of 1988±92 was used. {Pooled dataset for strains A-1 and M 131. **Jay (1992) reported for Staph. aureus that r5Á10 5 À1Á10 6 cfu g À1 must be present for food poisoning symptoms in man. Consequently, for a serving size of 100 g AV should actually be 10 8 cfu serving À1 . AV 10 6 cfu serving À1 is, however, used because of the safety perspective.
the logarithm of the estimated concentration of the hazard in the product (N) divided by the AV for the hazard (equation 3).
HC is a simple representation of log linearity of dose± response relations. For example, Buchanan et al. (1997) also assumed log-linearity of the dose±response relation for Listeria monocytogenes.
Level 1: Risk characterization. SIEFE uses characteristic numbers for risk characterization. Whereas the OC value describes the probability of occurrence of a hazard in the product, the HC value characterizes the probability of health impairment, given occurrence of the hazard. Together they characterize the probability of foodborne illness as a result of consuming a certain product. A measure of this probability is the PC value (`probability characterization'). PC is de®ned as the sum of OC and HC (equation 4).
PC OC HC 4
In level 1, probabilities are categorized from very low to very high, using the PC, OC and HC values, for example if PC is less than À 6 the probability of having problems is considered to be`very low'; less then one in a million people will have problems as a result of consuming a serving (100 g) of the product ( Table 2 ). The categories were chosen by sensible reasoning and can be changed if required.
After characterizing the probability of foodborne illness by PC, risk-determining phenomena of production processes are found by calculating the step characteristic SC (equation 5) and by considering knowledge rules.
SC calculates the logarithmic change in pathogens per process step. Process steps that are characterized by a high value of SC are generally major determinants of risk. Growth and inactivation have been categorized by means of the absolute value of SC, ranging from low to complete growth and inactivation ( Table 2 ).
The knowledge rules for selecting the risk-determining phenomena must explicitly be mentioned in the procedure to allow transparency. Consequently, they can be scrutinized and changed if necessary. The knowledge rules are shown in Table 3 . The goal of the ®rst level is to rank risks and ef®ciently establish risk-determining phenomena, using values that are conservative. It is best to try several situations, and vary several parameters in the ®rst level of detail, to be sure that no relevant risk-determining phenomena are overlooked.
Level 2 risk assessment
The risk-determining phenomena, identi®ed in level 1, are studied in a more quantitative way in the second level.
Level 2: Exposure assessment Ð process identification.
Temperature is often a risk-determining factor since both growth and inactivation greatly depend on it. For certain speci®c process steps, such as cooling, changes in temperature deserve special attention with regard to food safety. Below a practical example for estimation of temperature gradients is shown. Zwietering and Hasting (1997) derived practical equations for estimation of the temperature in the centre of (semi)solid products in batch systems without product con- Table 2 Categorization of the probability of having problems, and of growth and inactivation by characteristic numbers PC (probability characterization) and SC (step characterization). OC is the characteristic number for occurrence characterization and HC for healthproblem characterization PC, OC and HC SC growth * SC inactivation * Very low Table 2 ). The text printed in italics provides an explanation to the points 1Á1±7Á4
1. If PC is very low, because of complete inactivation: 1Á1. study recontamination after inactivation.
Since the inactivation is overwhelmingly large, it is not useful to study it more accurately. If recontamination occurs after inactivation, this may completely determine risk; if high growth occurs, or a highly infectious pathogen is concerned, the prevalence of recontamination is mainly important, if moderate or low growth occurs, the level of recontamination is important. 2. If PC is very low, because of high or very high inactivation:
2Á1. study recontamination after inactivation, 2Á2. study the parameters that determine growth, 2Á3. study the steps that result in the largest changes (see SC values).
The hazard is inactivated to a very high extent. However, inactivation is not complete, and therefore it is interesting to study it more accurately. Recontamination in an almost sterile product may completely determine risk. Small changes in process parameters may well change growth opportunities after inactivation, and thereby result in risk-determining process steps, so it is interesting to study growth-determining parameters in a scenario. 3. If PC is very low, with moderate, or low, or no inactivation:
3Á1. study the initial contamination level, 3Á2. study the parameters that determine growth, 3Á3. study the steps that result in the largest changes (see SC values).
The growth and inactivation kinetics appear not to be really relevant during the production process, so the initial contamination level can be riskdetermining. Also, small changes in process parameters may well change growth opportunities, and thereby result in risk-determining process steps. It is therefore interesting to study growth determining parameters in a scenario. 4. If PC is moderate or low, because of high or very high inactivation, or complete inactivation with recontamination:
4Á1. study dose±response data, 4Á2. study recontamination, 4Á3. study the steps that result in the largest changes (see SC values). The hazard is largely inactivated. However, remaining organisms or organisms that recontaminate the product after inactivation may be able to cause problems. Risk depends on which process step has the biggest in¯uence under certain circumstances. Accurate dose±response data may also be relevant, especially in the range of moderate risk estimates. 5. If PC is moderate or low, with moderate, or low, or no inactivation:
5Á1. study the initial contamination level, 5Á2. study dose±response data, 5Á3. study the parameters that determine growth, 5Á4. study inactivation (if present), 5Á5. study the steps that result in the largest changes (see SC values). The initial contamination level may be risk-determining, since growth and inactivation may exclude each other's effects. More accurate dose± response data may result in a different estimation of risk. Small changes in process parameters may well change growth opportunities and thereby result in other risk-determining process steps (other steps showing the largest changes); so it is interesting to study growth-determining parameters in a scenario. In level 1, inactivation is based on a worst-case value for the inactivation parameter k. Risk estimates may be lower if speci®c values are used for k. 6. If PC is high or very high, because of high or very high growth:
6Á1. study (re)contamination, 6Á2. study inactivation (if present), 6Á3. study the steps resulting in the largest changes (see SC values).
As organisms apparently are able to grow very well, prevalence of contamination, or recontamination after inactivation may completely determine risk. In level 1, inactivation is based on a worst-case value of k. Risk estimates may change if speci®c values are used. It is therefore interesting to re-estimate inactivation. Several inhibitory substances may result in less growth in practice, so the steps resulting in the largest changes are important to study. 7. If PC is high or very high, with moderate, low, or no growth:
7Á1. study (re)contamination, 7Á2. study dose±response data 7Á3. study inactivation (if present), 7Á4. study the steps resulting in the largest changes (see SC values). Prevalence of contamination, or recontamination after inactivation may completely determine risk, since the presence of the hazard, even in small amounts, results in high risk. Dose±response data apparently are very important for risk. In level 1, inactivation is based on a worst-case estimate of k. Risk estimates may change if speci®c values are used. It is therefore interesting to re-estimate inactivation.
vection. For example, in case the external resistance is negligible (often the case in food heat treatments), the centretemperature in a cylinder, with a height of two times the radius (R), can be described by:
T 0 is the initial temperature in the centre of the product, and T ext is the temperature of the heating or cooling medium. This equation is valid for Fo > 0Á0864, with Fo being the Fourier number:
where l is the thermal conductivity of the product (J s
, r is the product density (kg m À3 ) and L is the characteristic dimension (m). In this example, L is equal to the radius. Values for l, c p and r can be found in the literature for various products, see for example Tschubik and Maslow (1973) and Mohnsenin (1980) . If the values for a certain product are unknown, approximate values of similar products can be used. In many cases
; r 1000 kg m À3 (Anonymous 1978) , can be used as a ®rst approximation, since water is the major constituent of most food products.
Growth and inactivation at changing temperatures are estimated for small time steps, assuming temperature to be constant per time step.
Level 2: Exposure assessment Ð initial contamination.
Food products can be contaminated via raw materials (initial contamination) or by recontamination during the production process. SIEFE uses data from various literature references to help the user in selecting realistic contamination levels and incidences for the speci®c product and hazard under study. These data are stored in the food database (Van Gerwen et al. 1997) . Table 4 shows an example of data that have been stored in the database for contamination of various dairy products.
If contamination level or incidence are risk-determining, and there is a level of uncertainty in the estimates of contamination, it is sensible to use a range of contamination data to calculate exposure, for example N 0 1 to 10 4 cfu serving À1 . Then, the importance of a more accurate estima- tion of initial contamination can easily be deduced. Figure  1 shows an example where accurate estimation of contamination is not relevant, since the hazard is completely inactivated (reduction >10 20 ) during heat treatment in process step 5 for all scenarios of initial contamination from 1 to 10 4. This example clearly illustrates that it is not relevant to go into more detail when estimating a value (in this case contamination level). The conclusion would remain the same even if a very inaccurate value is used.
Level 2: Exposure assessment Ð recontamination.
Recontamination of the product occurs in many ways, for example, by workers' hands, micro-organisms present in stagnant areas and contact surfaces. At present, quantitative models to estimate recontamination are scarce. Data in the literature can, however, be used for support in estimation of recontamination. De Wit and Kampelmacher (1981) , for example, reported amounts of pathogens present on hands of workers in various food industries. These data can be used, and have been incorporated in the food database. As for initial contamination, it is sensible to use a range of values for recontamination if there is uncertainty in the estimates. Figure 1 shows an example of the irrelevance of accurate estimation of the level of recontamination. Whatever level of recontamination is used, from Fig.  1 it can be concluded that large growth takes place in process step 10, and the product will be unsafe in any case.
Level 2: Exposure assessment Ð inactivation and growth.
In level 2, inactivation and growth can best be estimated by several models and comparing the results of the models (Van Gerwen and Zwietering 1998) . Comparison of models is useful, as no single model is currently able to accurately predict microbial responses under all circumstances. Moreover, it gives an indication of the uncertainty and variability in estimation of growth and inactivation. Van Gerwen and Zwietering (1998) employed several primary and secondary models that can be applied for general predictive purposes, and these models have all been implemented in SIEFE. Also, the literature on speci®c growth and inactivation models (often response surface models) for various pathogens has been cited in SIEFE.
In addition to comparison by various models it is sensible to study the growth and inactivation parameters of the hazard in more detail in level 2. In level 1 worst-case estimates of these parameters were used, which may result in predictions that are unnecessarily conservative for the speci®c situation studied.
Level 2: Hazard characterization. In level 2 dose±response curves are created with the dose±response parameters available. In practice, there are relatively few dose±response data available to describe the probability of infection and they relate to a few infectious and toxico-infectious pathogens only. The problems associated with the extrapolation Buchanan et al. 1997) . Models to generate dose± response curves are, for example, the Exponential model and the Beta-Poisson model (Haas 1983; Teunis et al. 1996) . Some of the reported values of dose±response parameters for several bacteria with these two models are shown in Table 1 . The dose±response data result in an estimate of P h , being the probability of a certain health effect, for example infection and illness, given consumption of a contaminated product.
Severity (S) is a phenomenon that needs to be quanti®ed for estimation of consumer risk, regarding the CODEX (1997) de®nition of risk: a function of the probability of an adverse health effect and the severity of that effect, consequential to a hazard(s) in food. Severity can be considered as a weighing factor enabling hazard and risk ranking and facilitating health resource allocations. None of the formerly mentioned papers on quantitative risk assessment (Whiting and Buchanan 1997; Brown et al. 1998; Cassin et al. 1998) included quantitative data on the burden of disease into the risk estimates. The CAST report (1994) gives a straightforward, qualitative categorization of severity varying from`mild, self-limiting, for 1 day' to`severe, for months' that can be used as a practical tool for risk ranking.
Since there are very few quantitative data on severity of foodborne illness at the moment, it was decided to use S 1 in SIEFE for all risk assessments. Actually, this results in an estimate of the probability of having problems, instead of the actual risk. Supplemented by the qualitative categories presented by the CAST report (1994), the probability of having problems can still be used for risk and hazard ranking.
Level 2: Risk characterization. The risk characterization procedure estimates the risk of a certain health effect occurring as a consequence of the consumption of a certain food product. The risk to the consumer of a single consumption is:
Consumer risk P e ÁP h ÁS 6
where P e is the probability of a contaminated serving, S is a measure for severity (assumption S 1) and P h is the probability of a certain health effect (h) occurring. P h is based on dose±response data and data on foodborne disease outbreaks. For example, the probability of mortality can be described as (Haas et al. 1993; Teunis et al. 1996) :
where P(i|e) is the probability of infection, given a certain exposure (e). P(i|e) can for example be estimated with the Beta-Poisson model. P(ill|i) is the conditional probability of illness after infection. This probability was assumed to be independent of the ingested dose. If quantitative data are not available, P(ill|i) is assumed to be one (worst-case). P(d|ill) is the conditional probability of dying after developing disease. P(d|ill) can for example be based on foodborne outbreaks of disease ( Table 1 ), assuming that a constant fraction of infected individuals suffers from severe outcomes. Following equation 6, the risk of not having problems after n servings per year is:
The risk of having one or more problems by consuming n servings of a certain product per year can therefore be estimated by:
Like in level 1 the quantitative determination of the phenomena that are most in¯uential needs to be conducted subsequently.
If the estimates for P h and P e are very uncertain, it is best to estimate risk using ranges of values and test the importance of more accurate estimation of these parameters. This is presented for cheese spread in the present study. If parameter-estimates clearly affect risk estimations, it is sensible to accurately study the parameters in a third level of detail, for example, by experimental studies, a more extensive literature search and/or stochastic description of the parameters.
RESULTS

SIEFE applied to cheese spread
Hazard identification Ð cheese spread. The SIEFE method was applied to a processed cheese, namely cheese spread, de®ned by CODEX as`a product made by grinding, mixing, melting, and emulsifying with the aid of heat and emulsifying agents, one or more varieties of cheese, with or without addition of milk components and/or foodstuffs'.
The hazard identi®cation procedure, presented by Van Gerwen et al. (1997) selected Clostridium botulinum type A and Cl. botulinum type B proteolytic as the most obvious hazards for cheese spread. These organisms were reported to have caused outbreaks related to the consumption of cheese spread in the past (Meyer and Eddie 1951; Briozzo et al. 1983) . It is advisable to ®rst estimate risk for these pathogens, before focusing on other hazards.
Level 1: Exposure assessment Ð cheese spread. The production process of cheese spread used in this example was based on the literature (Caric and Kalab 1993) and practice, and is shown in Table 5 . Growth and inactivation as well as SC values were estimated (Table 5 ). Cl. botulinum type A is completely inactivated (SC < À 20) and proteolytic type B is highly inactivated during heat treatment (SC À 9Á61). OC log(N ai ) À I and À 9Á35, respectively, meaning very low occurrence in both cases (Table 2) .
Level 1: Hazard characterization Ð cheese spread. For both types of Cl. botulinum, AV was assumed to be 10 2 cfu serving À1 (Ter Steeg and Cuppers 1995).
HC was estimated to be very high for Cl. botulinum: HC log(1Á32/100) À 1Á88.
Level 1: Risk characterization Ð cheese spread. PC was estimated to be very low for both types of organisms: PC À I À 1Á88 À I for Cl. botulinum type A and PC À 9Á35±1Á88 À 11Á23 for proteolytic type B. Heat inactivation is obviously a risk-determining phenomenon that needs closer study for Cl. botulinum type B. For Cl. botulinum type A the reduction is overwhelmingly large and closer study is not necessary. Table 3 shows that other riskdetermining phenomena are: recontamination after inactivation and the parameters that determine growth after incomplete inactivation.
Various situations were simulated (four scenarios in total: cs1 to cs4) to get ®rst impressions on the importance of varying parameters. Table 5 shows the results of the simulations for Cl. botulinum type B proteolytic. 
À 2Á25 ± I À 9 Á 35 0 Probability of having problems Very low High Very low Very low Very high *Growth characteristics of Cl. botulinum type A and type B proteolytic: T min 10 C, T opt 35 C, T max 50 C, pH min 4Á6, pH opt 7, pH max 9, a w,min 0Á93 (Mitscherlich and Marth 1984; Shapton and Shapton 1991; ICMSF 1996) ; m opt 1 h À1 , from FDSS (Wijtzes et al. 1998) . The worst-case inactivation parameter k 145 # for Cl. botulinum type A: k 145 # 1Á82Á10 3 min À1 ; for Cl. botulinum type B proteolytic k 145 # 671 min À1. Data from ICMSF (1996) were used for estimation of k. {Heat treatment at 130 C, for 3 s. {Heat treatment at 145 C, for 6 s. xNon-cooled storage at 20 C. {Recontamination after heat treatment (1 cfu serving À1 ), non-cooled storage at 20 C. **Stepwise cooling was assumed.
Situation cs1, heat treatment: 130 C, for 3 s (Caric and Kalab 1993) . Application of this heat treatment results in a very high probability of having problems, PC ± 2Á91 for Cl. botulinum type A and À 2Á25 for proteolytic type B. The AV for Cl. botulinum was low, 10 2 cfu serving À1 , so even with only 1 cfu serving À1 present, HC log(1/10 2 ) À 2. It is obvious that presence of the hazard and AV are important for risk, and that a low PC can only be achieved by a low OC value (by high inactivation).
Situation cs2, heat treatment: 145 C, for 6 s. Application of this heat treatment results in a very low probability of having problems (PC À I). Cl. botulinum is completely inactivated (SC < À 20), so heat treatment is risk-determining. The inactivation is, however, so overwhelmingly large that it needs no further study. In this case it would be interesting to study recontamination more accurately, since this will probably completely determine risk (Table  3) .
Situation cs3, storage 20 C (compared with 10 C), for 8 weeks. The simulation results in very low probabilities for Cl. botulinum type B, PC À 9Á35. If N r AV, as in this situation, then HC 0, so PC OC HC OC. Consequently, inactivation is an important risk-determining phenomenon in this situation. If organisms remain in the product after inactivation (theoretically one in 10 9Á35 products), or recontamination occurs, the organisms are well able to grow at this temperature (SC 10, the maximum value of SC). It is therefore also sensible to study growth during storage and (re)contamination more accurately (Table 3) . Other phenomena can be omitted.
Situation cs4, heat treatment: 145 C, for 2 s, recontamination after inactivation and non-cooled storage at 20 C. As expected, very high probabilities for the hazards (PC 0) were predicted by simulation of this situation. Recontamination was assumed to occur, so OC 0 in this situation. Heat treatment is therefore not relevant for risk. Prevention of recontamination clearly is important, especially in case of non-cooled storage (SC storage 10). Storage and prevalence of recontamination are risk-determining phenomena in this scenario that need to be studied more accurately.
Heat treatment appeared to be risk-determining in several of the previous situations, provided that recontamination does not occur afterwards. If recontamination does occur, however, it is an important determinant of risk, especially in case of non-cooled storage. As an example, level 2 risk assessment will be performed for situation cs3 for Cl. botulinum type B proteolytic as this is the most heat resistant of the two hazards under study.
Level 2: Exposure assessment ± situation cs3, cheese spread. Heat treatment, prevalence of (re)contamination and growth during storage are the risk-determining phenomena for situation cs3 that need further study on this level.
Inactivation of Cl. botulinum type B proteolytic was studied by the exponential model as the primary inactivation model. Tailing was not taken into account because there was no indication in the literature of deviations from loglinearity during heat inactivation at 145 C. As in level 1, the worst-case value k 145 # 671 min À1 was used and the log reduction was estimated to be 9Á61. In level 2, inactivation was estimated using both k 145 # and the point estimate k 145 . The point estimate k 145 was calculated as k 145 ln (10) , and the log reduction >> 20. Considering the fact that both log reductions of 9Á61 (by the worst-case value) and of >> 20 are very high, it was decided to consider the inactivation complete (Table 6 , row 2). Because of this complete inactivation, it is not necessary to study prevalence of contamination more accurately.
Growth during storage was estimated assuming the three product characteristics: temperature 20 C, pH 6Á0, water activity (a w ) 0Á975. The following primary models were compared: the lag-exponential model (Van Gerwen and Zwietering 1998 ), the Baranyi model (Baranyi and Roberts 1994) , and the reparameterized Gompertz model (Zwietering et al. 1990) . The secondary growth models that were compared are: the gamma model (Zwietering et al. 1996) and the CTPM (Rosso et al. 1995) . The comparisons showed that there were no relevant differences between these models; they all estimated growth to be very high (N N max 10 10 ). The Central Composite Model and the Extended Total Model of Ter Steeg and Cuppers (1995) were used to compute the time to a 100-fold increase (t 100 ) of proteolytic Cl. botulinum in cheese spread. The models predicted t 100 1Á7 and t 100 3 weeks, respectively. Evidently, this results in too much growth in 8 weeks of storage.
In this case, the USDA Pathogen Modelling Program version 5Á0 could not be used, since a w 0Á975 was outside the model limits. The Tanaka model as described by Ter Steeg and Cuppers (1995) could not be used either, since this model was only applicable for 30 C. Based on the above results it must be concluded that it is likely that substantial growth occurs during 8 weeks of storage at 20 C. Using the simplest models available: the exponential and gamma models, growth was estimated to be N/N 0 10 10. The actual value of N can be neglected, since growth is too high anyway. The exposure was therefore estimated as e 10 10 cfu serving À1 (Table 6 , row 5). SIEFE informs the user that it is important to realize that the presence of various speci®c growth-inhibiting sub-stances is not included in most growth models and consequently growth estimates are fail safe.
The prevalence of recontamination is an important riskdetermining factor in this example. If recontamination occurs after complete inactivation, Cl. botulinum type B proteolytic is well able to grow in the cheese spread used in this example. Considering the good safety record of processed cheese (Wagenaar and Dack 1958; CollinsThompson and Wood 1993) , it is assumed that prevalence is very low, but quantitative estimation of prevalence (P e ) was not possible with the available information. For that reason, risk was estimated with P e ranging from 10 À20 to 1 (Table 6 , row 4).
Level 2: Hazard characterization Ð situation cs3, cheese spread. The probability of infection, illness, or mortality (P(i|e)) can be estimated by dose±response parameters for the hazard. In this example, however, no dose±response data for Cl. botulinum type B proteolytic were available besides the AV of 10 2 cfu serving À1 . Since the estimated amount of cfu serving À1 (e 10 10 ) is much higher than the AV, it was assumed that all servings contain toxin if they are contaminated and P(i|e) for intoxication was estimated to be 1 (Table 6 , row 7).
Intoxication was assumed to de®nitely result in illness, so P(ill|i) 1. If ill, the probability of dying was estimated as the mortality ratio; P(d|ill) 0Á15 (Hauschild 1993) . Severity (S) was assumed to be one. The qualitative categories presented in the CAST report (1994) indicated severe problems, for week to months.
Level 2: Risk characterization Ð situation cs3, cheese spread. The cheese used in this example is a hypothetical cheese, since its characteristics were based on the literature. Consequently, it was not known how many jars of the cheese spread are sold per year in a certain population, for instance in The Netherlands. For that reason, n was assumed to vary between 10 6 and 10 9 servings per year. Risk as a function of P e and n is shown in Fig. 2 . Relevant assumptions for estimation of risk are shown in Table 6 . For example, if prevalence is 10 À9 (one in 10 9 jars contains 1 cfu), and 10 8 servings are consumed per year, the probability that one or more people die in a year in The Netherlands as a result of consuming cheese spread is 1Á49 Â 10 À2 (Fig. 2) . This probability can be interpreted as one or more people dying of Cl. botulinum intoxication by this product every 70 years.
The consumer risk of dying from eating one serving of cheese spread is P e ÁP(i|e)ÁP(ill|i)ÁP(d|ill)ÁS P e Â 1 Â 1 Â 0Á15 Â 1. This shows that risk is totally determined by prevalence, and that really low frequencies (unmeasurable) should be achieved to control safety by frequency.
Recommendations for study in a third level of detail. Risk was estimated assuming that Cl. botulinum type B proteolytic is well able to grow in the product. Since growth estimates are probably worst-case, it is sensible to check growth experimentally by challenge testing in level 3.
The quantitative estimation of risk appeared to rely to a large extent on the prevalence of recontamination, P e , and the amount of servings consumed, n. Risk estimates should therefore be based on a more accurate estimation of these Table 6 Relevant assumptions for estimation of risk for Clostridium botulinum type B proteolytic in cheese spread
Assumption
Parameter Ill Mortality 1. The production process is shown in Table 5 2. Complete inactivation during heat treatment 3. Recontamination of the product after inactivation 4. Prevalence of recontamination ranges from P e 10 À20 to P e 1 P e 10 À20 À1 10 À20 À1 5. Very high growth after recontamination, resulting in an estimated exposure; e 10 10 cfu per serving e 10 10 10 10 6. The organism is very well able to grow, and therefore also able to form toxin 7. Since (e 10 10 ) >> (AV 10 2 ), it was assumed that every serving contains signi®cant amounts of toxin, so the probability of intoxication; P(i|e) tox 1 P(i|e) tox 1 1 8. Illness will de®nitely occur after consumption; it was assumed that P(ill|i) 1 P(ill|i) 1 1 9. The value for the mortality ratio, given illness; P(d|ill) 0Á15 P(d|ill) 0 Á 15 10. Severity was estimated as S 1 S 1 1 11. Amount of servings consumed per year in The Netherlands varies between n 10 6 and n 10 9 n 10 6 À10 parameters. n should normally be simple to estimate in practice, since sales data are generally known for most products per time period. Variations in n can be included in the risk assessment by describing n as a stochastic parameter. However, given the accuracy of prevalence estimates this probably does not largely improve the risk estimate. P e and variations in P e are more dif®cult to estimate, since no speci®c quantitative data on P e are available, and very low frequencies are practically impossible to measure. Regarding food safety control, it is a better strategy to focus on the design of a cheese spread composition that does not allow growth of Cl. botulinum or on measures that prevent recontamination, rather than to focus on accurate quantitative estimation of the prevalence of recontamination.
DISCUSSION
This paper describes a system (SIEFE) for microbial quantitative risk assessment for food products and production processes. The system is based on an approach to microbiological risk assessment that is different to other approaches by considering various levels of detail in the process of assessing risks. This stepwise approach avoids complexity and allows one to focus on the main problems. The ®rst, rough level of detail results in a ®rst estimate of risk and identi®es risk-determining phenomena. It was shown that the risk-determining phenomena related to the normal process can be used to ®nd pertinent failure scenarios and helps assure that no relevant risk-determining phenomena are overlooked. The ®rst level of detail uses the relatively simple characteristic numbers SC, OC, HC and PC for identi®cation of the risk-determining phenomena. The opportunity for hazard and risk ranking in the ®rst level of detail was not shown in this paper. If risks were assessed for various hazards, they could have been ranked according to their relevance for food safety by the PC values. The simplicity of the characteristic numbers makes them easy to understand. They provide clear quantitative insight into production processes which supports management decisions on control strategies.
The second level of detail studied the risk-determining phenomena more accurately. Quantitative data from various references in the literature were compared in addition to general and/or speci®c models for estimation of growth and inactivation. In this way, the problem could be studied from several points of view, and the risk could be estimated on a broad basis. The example showed that quantitative estimates of risk-determining phenomena are not always available either because of a lack of speci®c quantitative data or because of a lack of models and model parameters. It was shown that this shortcoming does not necessarily prevent risk estimation. Worst-case estimates were shown to be suf®cient for some risk-determining phenomena, whereas other risk-determining phenomena were described by a range of values. For more accurate risk assessments, the worst-case or ranging estimates could be studied in a third level of detail by stochastic description, by experiments, or by a more extensive literature search.
SIEFE is interactive and uses several information sources. Expert and literature knowledge have been captured in knowledge rules. Due to the clear de®nitions of -1 1 -9 -7 -5 -3 -1 Fig. 2 log(Risk) of having one or more problems per year as a function of the logarithm of the prevalence of recontamination, log(P e ), for Clostridium botulinum type B proteolytic in cheese spread. Log(Risk) for death (mortality ratio P(d|ill) 0Á15) is represented by (&) for n 10 6 ; (*) for n 10 7 ; (~) for n 10 8 ; (!) for n 10 9 . Log(Risk) for illness is shown by (&) for n 10 6 ; and (!) for n 10 9 . The dashed lines represent log(Consumer risk) for illness (&), and for death (&), for consumption of one serving of cheese spread the knowledge rules they can be scrutinized and changed when necessary. This supports the user in critically using the system thereby assessing most risks realistically. SIEFE can best be used by experienced microbiologists, as they are able to make the best use of the knowledge rules and can best interpret the system's estimates critically. With these advantages, and the fact that SIEFE focuses on products and their production processes, the system can be valuable as a component of a HACCP team. In this role it can be used proactively to support decisions on optimization of production processes according to a certain risk.
By ®rst selecting the quantitatively most important phenomena through SIEFE, quantitatively negligible aspects can be omitted based on explicit reasoning. Only for the risk-determining phenomena a high level of detail and stochastic assumptions have to be made. So, no resources are wasted in looking for less relevant parameters and stochastic data. By pinning down the problem, risk-determining variability and uncertainty can be revealed and handled ef®ciently.
